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The Enforceability of a
Spouse's Consent to a Will
Obtaining consent to the terms of a will from the testator's
spouse is a routine part of estate planning to many attorneys, yet few of them have considered the effect of such
a consent. The author of this Note analyzes the enforceability of a spouse's consent agreement under ordinary
contract principles and under special statutory provisions
dealing with such agreements. He concludes that although a spouse's consent may have some value, it is
subject to limitationsthat substantiallyimpairits usefulness
in most jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION
A surviving spouse has long had a right that cannot be defeated
by will to share in her spouse's estate.' If the surviving spouse exercises this right by electing to take against a will, the testator's
plan of testamentary disposition will be frustrated.2 Often a testator attempts to prevent such frustration by obtaining his spouse's
consent to the terms of his will before his death. The consent
agreement has an obvious advantage over such other methods of estate planning as inter vivos gifts because it enables the testator
to retain control over his assets.3
The purpose of this Note is to examine the effect of a consent
1. The common-law estates of dower and curtesy have been either abolished or substantially modified in many states. Even in such states, however, a surviving spouse has a statutory right to share in her spouse's estate
that cannot be defeated by will. 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS

§§ 188-89, 216 (1935).
2. See Shannon v. Eno,
In re Estate of Donovan, 409
Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md.
206 Miss. 420, 40 So. 2d 258

120 Conn. 77, 179 AtI. 479 (1935);
Ill. 195, 98 N.E.2d 757 (1951); Mercantile
18, 166 Atd. 599 (1933); Campbell v. Cason,
(1949); Stachnick Estate, 376 Pa. 592, 103

A.2d 765 (1954). See generally Comment, 38 MARQ. L. REV. 36 (1954);

Comment, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 123 (1961). The testator's plan will probably
also be frustrated with respect to beneficiaries other than the electing
spouse, for they must contribute unless there is sufficient intestate property
to satisfy the electing spouse's statutory share. See Hart v. Hart. 95
Colo. 471, 37 P.2d 754 (1934); Ruh's Ex'rs v. Ruh, 270 Ky. 792, 110 S.W.2d
1097 (1937); Latta v. Brown, 96 Tenn. 343, 34 S.W. 417 (1896). See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 291 (1954).

3. But cf. Schwartz, A Bird's Eye View of Basic Estate Planning Vehicles,

43 B.U.L. REV. 250, 254-55 (1963), explaining some of the tax advantages of the use of inter vivos gifts.

1963]

NOTES

873

to the terms of a will, given during the testator's lifetime, that
purports to waive dower or similar rights solely in exchange for

certain provisions in the will. The historical treatment of a consent
agreement and its effect both under contract principles and under
various statutory provisions will be analyzed.
I.

EFFECT OF A CONSENT AGREEMENT UNDER
CONTRACT PRINCIPLES

A.

HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF A CONSENT AGREEMENT

Until comparatively recent times, agreements by which a spouse
purported to waive her dower or similar rights were generally held
to be void" regardless of the agreement's fairness5 or of the fact
4. A spouse's consent given during the testators lifetime could not have
been sustained under the doctrine of election. This doctrine presupposes a
plurality of rights or gifts. See GARDNER, WILLS § 168 (1903); PAGE,
WILLS § 710 (1901). Since a spouse does not derive rights from a will until
the testators death, she does not have a plurality of rights prior to her
spouse's death. See Owen v. Paramount Prods., Inc., 41 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.
Cal. 1941); Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 111 P.2d 322 (1941); Strange v.
State Tax Comm'n, 192 Miss. 765, 7 So. 2d 542 (1942); Dawson v. Corbett,
71 S.D. 106, 21 N.W.2d 758 (1946). Furthermore, a married woman was
considered incompetent to make an election. 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1097 (12th ed. 1877).
An obligation to elect did not arise merely because the testator had
named his spouse a beneficiary of his will. Since there was a presumption
that a devise or bequest to a widow was to be taken in addition to dower,
the testator had to indicate clearly that the testamentary provisions for
his spouse were to be in lieu of her dower right to compel an election by
the widow. Trafton v. Trafton, 96 N.H. 188, 72 A.2d 457 (1950); see
Estate of Ettlinger, 73 Cal. App. 2d 967, 167 P.2d 738 (Dist. Ct. App.
1946). When the testator had obtained his spouse's consent to the terms of
his will, however, the presumption was easily overcome because the intended
effect of the consent was to waive dower. See Kreiser's Appeal, 69 Pa.
194 (1870). Therefore, the courts could not hold that the widow had no
obligation to elect and were compelled to determine the effect of the consent agreement. Statutes have changed the common-law presumption in
many states. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 191, § 17 (1955); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2107.42 (Page 1954). See generally Phelps, The Widow's
Right of Election in the Estate of Her Husband, 37 MICH. L. REV. 236,
241 (1938).
5. See Whitworth v. Carter, 43 Miss. 61 (1870); Huntley v. Whitner,
77 N.C. 392 (1877). Equity courts sometimes gave effect to an agreement by which a wife purported to waive dower. E.R., Mannine v. Pipoen,
86 Ala. 357, 5 So. 572 (1889); Eberhart v. Rath, 89 Kan. 329, 131 Pac.
604 (1913); Kaiser's Estate, 199 Pa. 269, 49 At. 79 (1901): see 3
STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1799 (14th ed. 1918). Such agreements
were presumptively invalid in equity, however, because the wife was thounht
to be under the control of the husband. Ireland v. Ireland, 43 N.J. Ea.
311, 12 At. 184 (Ch. 1888). To overcome this presumption, the husband
(or his representative) had the burden of showing that the "contract was
fair, open, reasonable, and well understood." Id. at 315, 12 AUt. at 186.
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that the spouse had received consideration for her waiver.' At
common law, a wife was under a general disability to contract 7
or to dispose of real property by will;' she could, therefore, make
no agreement of any kind. Nearly all of the common-law disabilities imposed upon married women have now been removed by
married women's legislation 9 and maxims of equity."0 Since a
married woman now has the capacity to make a will" and to contract, 12 a consent to a will by either husband or wife is governed
by ordinary contract principles.
Moreover, husband and wife were regarded as a single legal person at common law and hence were incapable of contracting inter
se. 13 Contracts between husband and wife are now generally sub6. See, e.g., In re Shulenburg's Estate, 114 Misc. 155, 187 N.Y. Supp.
251 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
7. Eberwine v. State ex rel. Koster, 79 Ind. 266 (1881); Shirk v. Stafford, 31 Ind. App. 247, 67 N.E. 542 (1903); Edwards v. McEnhill, 51 Mich.
160, 16 N.W. 322 (1883); Whitworth v. Carter, 43 Miss. 61 (1870); Citizens'
State Bank v. Smout, 62 Neb. 223, 86 N.W. 1068 (1901); Huntley v.
Whitner, 77 N.C. 392 (1877); Kriz v. Peege, 119 Wis. 105, 95 N.W. 108
(1903).
8. Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525 (1815); GARDNER, WILLS § 25
(1903). A married woman did, however, have the right to make a will of
personalty with her husband's consent. Burton v. Holly, 18 Ala. 408 (1850);
Morse v. Thompson, 56 Mass. (4 Cush.) 562 (1849); Marston v. Norton,
5 N.H. 205 (1830). The husband's consent was similar to an unexecuted
gift, for the ownership of her personal property vested absolutely in her
husband at the time of marriage. Allen v. Hooper, 50 Me. 371 (1862).
Thus, the right to will personal property was for the most part illusory
since the husband could revoke his consent not only at any time during
marriage, Reed v. Blaisdell, 16 N.H. 194 (1844); Brook v. Turner, 2 Mod.
170, 86 Eng. Rep. 1005 (C.P. 1677), but also at any time prior to probate. George v. Bussing, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 558 (1855); Van Winkle v.
Schoonmaker, 15 N.J. Eq. 384 (Prerogative Ct. 1862); In re Wagner's Estate, 2 Ashmead 448 (Pa. 1840).
9. See 3 VERNIER, op. cit. supra note 1, § 156.
10. SCHOULER, WILLS § 47 (2d ed. 1892).
11. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 1 (1955); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 657 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-1 (1949); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 32-101, -102 (1955).
12. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 158; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-9
(1958); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 6 (1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-101
(1949); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 26.181 (1948). A statute that purports to
enable a married woman to contract as if she were unmarried does not
necessarily allow her to contract with her husband. 3 VERNIER, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 156. For a statute to allow husband and wife to contract
inter se, it must be construed as not only removing the inability of a wife
to make a binding promise, but also as dispensing with the common-law
doctrine that husband and wife are a single legal entity. Some states have
retained the common-law prohibition of contracts between husband and
wife. E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209, § 2 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 61 (1958). Some states prohibit certain kinds of contracts between
husband and wife. E.g.. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1790 (West 1952):
MINN. STAT. § 519.06 (1961).
13. Rowe v. Hamilton, 3 Me. 63 (1824); Robertson v. Robertson, 114
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ject to ordinary contract principles."' Due to the confidential relationship that exists between them, however, a high standard of
fairness is demanded of such contracts on the ground that one of
the parties is likely to have dominated the other.' 5 In the conN.J.L. 558, 177 At. 896 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Henricks v. Isaacs, 117 N.Y.
411, 22 N.E. 1029 (1889). At least one court recognized that the single
person concept was merely a technical ground for not enforcing agreements between husband and wife, and that the real basis for the rule was
that the wife was so under the influence of her husband that she was
deprived of her contractual volition. Brown v. Dalton, 105 Ky. 669, 49
S.W. 443 (1899).
14. Vock v. Vock, 365 Ill. 432, 6 N.E.2d 843 (1937); Rudd v. Rudd,

318 Mo. 935, 2 S.W.2d 585 (1928). The effect that the Statute of Frauds
may have upon a consent agreement is uncertain. The agreement would

seem to be within the statute. A contract to devise land is clearly within

the statute's sale of land provision and hence must be in writing. Fred v.
Asbury, 105 Ark. 494, 152 S.W. 155 (1912); Snyder v. French, 272 11.
43, 111 N.E. 489 (1916); Wright v. Green, 67 Ind. App. 433, 119 N.E.
379 (1918); Swash v. Sharpstein, 14 Wash. 426, 44 Pac. 862 (1896); Nelson v. Christensen, 169 Wis. 373, 172 N.W. 741 (1919). Similarly, a contract to bequeath personalty in excess of a certain amount must be in
writing. Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522, 5 N.E. 666 (1886); Maloney v.
Maloney, 258 Ky. 567, 80 S.W.2d 611 (1935); Boyle v. Dudley, 87 N.H.
282, 179 At. 11 (1935). But a writing does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds
unless it shows an intent to make a contract. Brought v. Howard, 30 Ariz.
522, 249 Pac. 76 (1926); Curry v. Cotton, 356 111. 538, 548, 191 N.E.
307, 311 (1934); Gibson v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S.W.2d 985 (1932);
Hale v. Hale, 90 Va. 728, 731, 19 S.E. 739, 741 (1894). The will and consent construed together would not seem to be sufficient evidence that the
testator intended to create an irrevocable will. See note 23 infra and accompanying text. The will and consent clearly manifest the testators intention to make some kind of a contract, for his purpose in procuring a consent to his will is to have his spouse agree to a particular disposition. Even
if this is true, however, there does not appear to be sufficient writings
to charge the testator's estate with an enforceable obligation; the testator
has not signed a memorandum indicating his intent to make a contract. In
contrast, since a consent explicitly states an intention to agree to take
under a particular will, there would clearly appear to be sufficient writings
to charge the consenting spouse with an enforceable obligation. See 20
CALIF. L. REV. 217, 218 (1932).
Two writers have examined in great detail the effect that the Statute
of Frauds can have upon a contract to make a will. SPARKS, CONTRACTS
To MAKE WILLS 39-49 (1956); Schnebly, Contracts To Make Testamentary
Dispositions as Affected by the Statute of Frauds, 24 MICH. L. REV.
749 (1926).
15. Barnett v. Barnett, 262 Ala. 655, 80 So. 2d 626 (1955); Marsiglia
v. Marsiglia, 78 Cal. App. 2d 701, 178 P.2d 478 (Dist. Ct. Apn. 1947);
Peyton v. William C. Peyton Corp., 23 Del. Ch. 321, 7 A.2d 737 (Sup.
Ct. 1939); Miethe v. Miethe, 410 Ill. 226, 101 N.E.2d 571 (1951); Stokes
v. Stokes, 119 Misc. 168, 196 N.Y. Supp. 184 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Charlson v.
Charlson, 50 N.D. 677, 197 N.W. 778 (1924); Brewer v. Brewer, 8d Ohio
App. 35, 78 N.E.2d 919 (1948). This reasoning is unlike the usual rule that
a contract's validity is not contingent unon its fairnpss. Woods v. Griffi',
204 Ark. 514, 163 S.W.2d 322 (1942); Brawley v. Crosby Research Foundation, Inc., 73 Cal. Aup. 2d 103. 166 P.2d 392 (Dist. Ct. Ann. 1946): Wolfe
v. Breman, 69 Ga. App. 813, 26 S.E.2d 633 (1943); Hillcrest Foundation,
Inc. v. McFeaters, 332 Pa. 497, 2 A.2d 775 (1938).
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text of consent agreements, this confidential relationship at least
imposes a duty upon the testator to disclose to his spouse the
amount of his property and her statutory rights in that property."0

Even more recently, a few courts have analogized a wife's
dower interest prior to her husband's death to an expectant heir's
interest in his ancestor's property; therefore, they held that dower
could not be released because it was a mere expectancy.' 7 Most

courts, however, have distinguished the interest of a spouse from
an expectancy and have concluded that it could be released prior
to the husband's death because it is a present interest in property
that cannot be defeated by will."8

B.

EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE TESTATOR'S
DEATH

The validity of a consent agreement is difficult to sustain under
bilateral contract principles because it seems to lack mutuality of
obligation. 9 A will is in effect an unexecuted gift, and therefore,
the testator can change or revoke his will at any time prior to his
death." This problem of mutuality could be obviated by holding

that when a testator has obtained his spouse's consent to the terms
of his will, he has by implication created an irrevocable will.2 '

16. Williams v. Sechler, 127 Kan. 314, 273 Pac. 447 (1929); Menke v.
Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924); State ex rel. Minnesota Loan
& Trust Co. v. Probate Court, 129 Minn. 442, 152 N.W. 845 (1915).
17. McGee v. Sigmund, 109 Ohio St. 375, 142 N.E. 676 (1924); see
Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Hubbard, 222 Ala. 518, 133 So. 723 (1931). The
reasoning most frequently used to prevent the sale of an expectant heir's
interest was that he had no present interest to sell. E.g., Dart v. Dart, 7
Conn. 250 (1828). Public policy was also thought to prohibit a sale of
an expectancy. Dailey v. Springfield, 144 Ga. 395, 87 S.E. 479 (1915); Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112 (1810). The courts reasoned that if they were
to give effect to such agreements, the ancestor would have no control over
the expectant heir since the latter need not fear disinheritance. Thus, instead of living virtuously in order to influence his ancestor, the expectant
heir "may indulge in prodigality, idleness, and vice." Id. at 122. Also, if
the sale of an expectancy were sustained without the ancestor's knowledge,
it would be a fraud on him, for the gift intended for his heir would go to
a stranger. Stevens v. Stevens, 181 Mich. 438, 148 N.W. 225 (1914).
18. E.g., Hoagland v. Hoagland, 113 Ohio St. 228, 148 N.E. 585 (1925)
(overruling McGee v. Sigmund, supra note 17); Smith v. Smith, 57 Ohio
St. 27, 48 N.E. 28 (1897); see Higgins v. St. Joseph Loan & Trust Co.,
98 Ind. App. 674, 186 N.E. 910 (1933).
19. See Kreiser's Appeal, 69 Pa. 194 (1871).
20. See Lawrence v. Ashba, 115 Ind. App. 485, 59 N.E.2d 568 (1945);
Dixon v. Dameron's Adm'r, 256 Ky. 722, 77 S.W.2d 6 (1934); Succession
of Dambly, 191 La. 500, 186 So. 7 (1938); Lowe v. Fickling, 207 S.C.
442, 36 S.E.2d 293 (1945); GARDNER, WILLS § 3 (2d ed. 1916).
21. One court has suggested that a consent agreement gives rise to "a
legally implied promise" that the testator will refrain from changing or revoking his will. Gaines v. California Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d 709, 711,
121 P.2d 28, 29 (Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (dictum).
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It seems rather anomalous, however, to suggest that a testator

who had sufficient knowledge of estate planning to obtain his
spouse's consent would intend to create an irrevocable will without expressly providing for its irrevocability.2 2 Although he would
thus prevent his spouse from electing against his will, he would
also bind himself to a plan of testamentary disposition that could
become obsolete either because of a change in the nature or value
of his property, or because of the death or other change in the
status of a beneficiary. Thus, the mere fact that the testator has obtained his spouse's consent to the terms of his will would not seem
to be3 sufficient evidence that he intended the will to be irrevoca2

ble.

Instead of creating an irrevocable will, a consent agreement
22. The term "irrevocable will" is a misnomer. Once it is determined
that an instrument is irrevocable, it cannot be a will. PAGE, WILLS § 50
(1901). An "irrevocable will" is nothing more than a contract. Ward v.
Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d 635 (1938).
23. The numerous advantages of a will aside from its revocability, such
as the retention of control over or power to alienate and to encumber the
assets of the testator, would be lost if the instrument were construed to be
a contract. See 1 PAGE, WILLS § 6.1 (Bowe & Parker rev. 1960).
If the consent were obtained simultaneously with the will's execution,
other factors would seem to indicate that the testator did not intend to
create an irrevocable will. First, such a finding would be inconsistent with
the use of testamentary language, such as "will," "devise," or "bequest"
because an essential characteristic of a will is its revocability. McDonald v.
Polansky, 48 N.M. 518, 153 P.2d 670 (1944); Lewis' Estate, 139 Pa. Super.
83, 11 A.2d 667 (1940); see Dwight v. Dwight, 64 R.I. 294, 12 A.2d 227
(1940). Some courts have held that an irrevocability clause in an instrument that purports to be a will does not prevent its revocation. O'Hara
v. O'Hara, 185 Md. 321, 44 A.2d 813 (1945); Wilks v. Bums, 60 Md. 64
(1882); Sellyei v. Lecso, 28 N.J. Super. 593, 101 A.2d 26 (Ch. 1953). Furthermore, finding a testator-intention to create an irrevocable will renders
execution in accordance with the statutory formalities for the execution of
a will superfluous; there is no need for witnesses, for example, if the parties intended to create only a contract. There would be a need for the statutory formalities, however, if the instrument were construed to be partly a
will and partly a contract. See In the Matter of the Estate of Wyss, 112
Cal. App. 487, 297 Pac. 100 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931); SCHOULER, WILLS § 270
(2d ed. 1892). This construction would, however, be rather unusual because
a contract and a will are not normally executed on the same instrument.
Also, such a construction may be of doubtful validity when the testator
and consenting spouse have children; if the consent were given in exchange for certain provisions in the will for the children, the entire instrument could be irrevocable because the children would be third-party
beneficiaries to the consent agreement.
If the consent were obtained after the will's execution, there may be a
more reasonable basis for holding that the will is irrevocable. The testator
may then have intended it to be revocable at the time of its execution,
but subsequently converted it into a contract through the consent cl,-use.
Courts have demanded a high standard of proof, however, to show that a
will was incorporated into a contract. E.g., Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604,
269 Pac. 450 (1928).
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could be construed to bind the consenting spouse as long as the
testator does not change or revoke his will.24 Although a consent
clause generally does not contain any limitation concerning the
binding effect of the consenting spouse's agreement,"5 it would
not seem reasonable to conclude that she ever intends her consent
to be irrevocable. The agreement is executed with reference to the
testator's existing property and may be wholly inappropriate if the
status and amount of that property substantially changes. Furthermore, there would not seem to be a valid contract binding the
consenting spouse under such a construction. Forbearance may,
under some circumstances, constitute valid consideration, 0 but
holding the consenting spouse bound as long as the testator does
not revoke his will seems to overlook the fact that he has not given
up the right to revoke his will. This power to revoke the will with8
out incurring liability27 would seem to make the contract illusory.1
A consent agreement could also be construed as a unilateral
contract.2 9 The consent would operate as an offer to the testatorif he does not change or revoke his will, the consenting spouse
will be bound at his death. Thus, the testator could change or revoke his will without incurring liability because he is, in effect,
rejecting the offer. Similarly, the consenting spouse could revoke
her consent prior to the testator's death in the same manner that
an offer is terminated.
Considering a consent to the terms of a will as an offer for a
unilateral contract appears to be the only contract theory upon
which such an agreement can be sustained. Such a construction
may arguably render the consent agreement ineffectual. Since at
common law the death of the offeree would terminate the offer,30
the testator's death would seem to terminate the consent. This
24. See O'Neil v. Ross, 98 Cal. App. 306, 277 Pac. 123 (Dist. Ct. App.
1929) (dictum).
25. See, e.g., BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS § 10182 (1957); 3

JONES, LEGAL FORMS 1074-75 (10th ed. 1962).

26.
§ 113
27.
1929)
28.

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(3d ed. 1957).
See O'Neil v. Ross, 98 Cal. App. 306, 277 Pac. 123 (Dist. Ct. App.
(dictum).
This construction would also seem to be in conflict with the standard

of fairness demanded of contracts between husband and wife. If the consent

agreement became disadvantageous to the testator, he could merely revoke
his will, but the consenting spouse would be bound even though the agreement became disadvantageous by virtue of an increase in the testator's
property.
29. Comment, 15 Sw. L.J. 85, 127 (1961); 20 CALIF. L. REV. 217,
218 (1932).
30. Ritchie v. Rawlings, 106 Kan. 118, 186 Pac. 1033 (1920); Achenbach
v. Kurtz, 306 Pa. 384, 159 Atl. 718 (1932); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 54 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 62 (3d ed. 1957).
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argument, however, ignores the fact that the death of the testator
with the terms of the will unaltered is the very act that the parties
intended to constitute an acceptance; therefore, the death of the
testator would consummate the contract and bind the consenting
spouse." Furthermore, construing the consent agreement as a unilateral contract is consistent with the standard of fairness required
of contracts between husband and wife; since each of the parties
is free to revoke his part of the agreement, they can avoid the inequities that might result from a substantial change in the testator's
property after the consent has been given.
Construing the consent agreement as a unilateral contract does
not substantially lessen its usefulness as an estate planning tool.
Although the testator has no assurance during his lifetime that the
consenting spouse will not revoke the consent, the right to elect
against his testamentary plan will be barred after his death if no
earlier revocation has occurred. Moreover, a number of factors indicate that revocation of the consent during the testator's life would
be infrequent. Ignorance of a change in the testator's property,
recognition that a testator could partially defeat the spouse's
statutory rights by inter vivos gifts, and simply the moral obligation to comply with the testator's plan of testamentary disposition
all make the possibility of a spouse withdrawing her consent improbable.
C.

EFFECT OF
DEATH

THE

AGREEMENT

AFTER

THE

TESTATOR'S

Although lack of mutuality of obligation would seem to indicate
that a consent agreement has no effect during the testator's lifetime, his death eliminates the lack of mutuality because he can
then no longer change or revoke his will. The enforceability of
such a contract after the testator's death may be barred, however,
by a lack of consideration or a failure to meet the standard of fairness required of contracts between husband and wife.
1.

The Problem of Consideration

If a consenting spouse is to receive less under a will than under
her statutory rights, there would appear to be a lack of consideration since she has received nothing that she was not entitled to
receive prior to the execution of the consent agreement. The most
obvious case of the consenting spouse receiving no benefit in exchange for the consent is where the will gives her a fractional share
of the testator's estate that is equal to or less than her statutory
31. See 20 CALIF. L. REV. 217, 218 (1932).
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fractional share.32 If the consenting spouse is to receive a fixed
amount under the will, however, there would seem to be consideration to support the consent agreement. Since the spouse's statutory share is generally of indeterminate value, the consenting spouse
may reasonably consider the fixed amount provided in the will
to be worth more than the yet undetermined value of her statutory
share.3
Although there may be no consideration for the consent because the consenting spouse would derive greater benefits by an
election against the will, reliance upon the consent by the testator
may constitute sufficient consideration to bind the consenting
spouse to the consent agreement.34 In reliance upon the consent,
the testator may have failed to include in his will an alternative
plan of testamentary disposition to be effective upon an election
against the will. Detrimental reliance by the testator could also
consist of a failure to make inter vivos gifts to effectuate the desired plan of distribution of his property. Therefore, allowing
32. For example, if the consenting spouse is to receive one-third of
the testator's estate under the will and her statutory share is one-half of the
testator's estate, the consenting spouse has received no benefit. In such a
case, the consenting spouse's right to share in the testator's estate can be
compared, for the purpose of determining the presence of consideration,
with the right of one to whom a legal duty is owed. "It has long been supposed that the performance of an already existing legal duty is not a sufficient consideration for a promise, even though it is bargained for by the
promisor and is actually given as the agreed exchange for the promise."
Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV.

449, 456 (1937). The application of this rule to rights that arise out of the
marital relation has been made in contracts other than consent agreements.
E.g., Rudd v. Rudd, 318 Mo. 935, 2 S.W.2d 585 (1928), where the court
held that a contract that purported to impose upon a husband the duty to
support his family failed for lack of consideration.
33. But cf. Spratt v. Lawson, 176 Mo. 175, 75 S.W. 642 (1903), where
the court valued the statutory share and held that the agreement failed for
lack of consideration because an election against the will would have given
greater benefits than those to be derived under the will. The consenting
spouse was to receive $7,000 under the will, and the court valued the statutory share at more than twice that amount. The reasoning of the court
appears to be unsound as to the presence of consideration because of the
general rule "that the fairness of an exchange is legally irrelevant." FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 335 (1947). The court's result, however, seems
correct because of the standard of fairness demanded of contracts between
husband and wife. See case cited note 36 infra and accompanying text.
34. In the Matter of the Estate of Wyss, 112 Cal. App. 487, 496-97,
297 Pac. 100, 104 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931). Under this theory, the consenting
spouse should be able to revoke the consent prior to the testator's death,
for the testator would not be prejudiced since he could change or revoke
his will.
35. This reliance would seem to be within the so-called "promissory estoppel" section of the Restatement of Contracts:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to in-
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the consenting spouse to elect against the will may permit her to
share in property that the testator would have disposed of during
his lifetime but for his reliance upon her consent. Thus, the requirement of consideration to support a consent agreement would seem
to be satisfied either by a provision in the will granting the spouse
property differing in kind or measurement from her statutory share
or by the detrimental reliance of the testator.
2.

The Problem of Fairness

Due to the confidential relationship that exists between husband
and wife, the mere presence of consideration is not enough to validate a consent agreement; it must also be "fair." In Gaines v.
CaliforniaTrust Co.,36 a California court held that a consent agreement by which the consenting spouse would have derived greater
benefits by an election against the will than by taking under the
will did not satisfy the standard of fairness demanded of contracts between husband and wife. The court did not mention
detrimental reliance in Gaines, but presumably this also would be
relevant to the fairness requirement. The testator's reliance could
be considered as additional consideration to that received by the
consenting spouse under the will. In Gaines, the agreement was so
inequitable, however, that perhaps the court ignored detrimental
reliance because the testator's reliance would not have been sufficient to overcome the inequity.
The Gaines court would seem to be correct in concluding that
the consent agreement's fairness must be determined at the time
of the testator's death. In this respect, a consent agreement can be
distinguished from an agreement under which a spouse releases
her statutory rights and receives consideration simultaneously with
the agreement's'executionY In such cases, the agreement's fairduce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on
the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or for-

bearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise.
1 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 90 (1932). The fact that the reliance may
have been bargained for in a consent agreement should not prevent the application of § 90. The courts have generally ignored the fact that the section
was designed to apply to unbargained-for reliance, and have construed the
section as creating a broad rule that reliance may make a promise enforceable. FULLER, op. cit. supra note 33, at 363-64.
36. 48 Cal. App. 2d 709, 121 P.2d 28 (Dist. CL App. 1941). The Gaines
decision was based on a state statute that provided that transactions between
husband and wife were governed by the principle of confidential relations.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 158. Since this statute merely seems to codify the rule
prevailing in other jurisdictions, the rationale employed by the court should
not be limited to California.
37. Such agreements are valid in a majority of states. ATKINSON,
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ness should be determined by a comparison of the benefits received by the releasing spouse to the value of her statutory rights
at the time of the agreement's execution. 38 The fact that the releasing spouse would have obtained greater benefits by an election against the will at the time of the testator's death does not
invalidate the agreement for lack of fairness since the consideration was exchanged at the time the agreement was executed. When
a spouse releases statutory rights solely in exchange for certain
provisions in a will, however, unless the will is rendered irrevocable,
the consent agreement is of no effect until the testator's death, and
therefore, the amount of the consideration received by the consenting spouse cannot be determined until that time.

D.

THE CONSENT AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY

In a Tennessee case, Shirley v. Shirley,39 an executor of a
will sought a declaratory judgment concerning the effect of a consent agreement. The trial court and court of appeals held that the
consent was ineffectual because the consenting spouse had not
been sufficiently informed of the extent of the testator's property
prior to the agreement's execution. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed, but on a much broader basis; although a husband and
wife clearly have the power to contract in Tennessee,40 the court
reasoned that this type of an agreement would tend to disturb
marital relations and was therefore void "whatever the circumstances or considerations."'"
In view of the fairness requirements imposed upon contracts
between a husband and wife, a consent agreement would not seem
to disturb marital relations as much as alternative methods of estate planning that the testator may be forced to use if consent were
not available. Since the agreement's validity is contingent upon a
proper disclosure of the testator's property and the consenting
spouse's statutory rights in that property, 42 any friction that might
arise from fraud or undue influence is obviated. If no such disWILLS § 31 (2d ed. 1953); see, e.g., Remington v. Remington, 69 Colo.
206, 193 Pac. 550 (1920); Van Koten v. Van Koten, 323 II1. 323, 154 N.E.
146 (1926); Hilbish v. Hattie, 145 Ind. 59, 68-70, 44 N.E. 20, 23 (1896);
Marty v. Marty, 111 Kan. 120, 206 Pac. 324 (1922); Rhoades v. Davis, 51
Mich. 306, 16 N.W. 659 (1883); Jorgensen v. Crandell, 134 Neb. 33, 277
N.W. 785 (1938).
38. See, e.g., Megginson v. Megginson, 367 I1. 168, 10 N.E.2d 815 (1937)
(antenuptial agreement).
39. 181 Tenn. 364, 181 S.W.2d 346 (1944).
40. Howell v. Davis, 196 Tenn. 334, 268 S.W.2d 85 (1954); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-601 (1955).
41. 181 Tenn. at 367, 181 S.W.2d at 347.
42. Cases cited note 16 supra.
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closure has been made, the consenting spouse will probably not
fully realize the effect of a consent agreement until the testator's
death, 3 and marital disharmony will not arise over unknown
rights. If the testator cannot depend upon a consent agreement to
prevent a frustration of his plan of testamentary disposition, he may
be encouraged to make substantial inter vivos gifts which may
greatly disrupt marital harmony.
The court in Shirley also reasoned that the consent agreement
was invalid because the election statute was the exclusive means of
waiving the right to dissent from a will, and the consent could
not operate as an election since election statutes refer to a right of
choice after the testators death."' The purpose of this construction is to protect the consenting spouse from improvident contracts. The spouse is prohibited from waiving her right to a share
in the testator's estate and receiving in exchange consideration
that is insufficient for her support.4 5 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court has taken a similar position; it has held that a contract that
purports to waive the right to dissent from a will is valid only
if it provides greater benefits than those to be derived from an election against a will.46
Policy considerations would seem to indicate that a consent
agreement should be enforced when it meets the requirements of
fairness and adequacy of consideration. Although it is clearly
within the public interest to protect a person's means of support
from improvident agreements, the consenting spouse's rights would
seem to be adequately protected in consent agreements by the requirement of disclosure, the necessity for adequate consideration,
and in many cases, by the self-interest of the consenting spouse.
Furthermore, a consent agreement is advantageous over other
methods of preventing a frustration of the testators plan of testamentary disposition-such as inter vivos gifts, contracts to make a
43. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mueller v. Probate Court, 226 Minn. 346,
32 N.W.2d 863 (1948).
44. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-501 (Supp. 1961); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3,
§§ 16-17 (1961); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-605 (1955); see note 4 supra.

45. The Tennessee Supreme Court seems to have modified its views on
the public policy recognized in Shirley. In a case decided three years later,
the court held that a widow had waived her right to dissent from her husband's will because the parties had executed mutual wills. Church of Christ
Home for Aged, Inc. v. Nashville Trust Co., 184 Tenn. 629, 202 S.W.2d 178
(1947). The court distinguished Shirley on the ground that the consenting
spouse had not been adequately informed.
46. Horton v. Cronley, 270 P.2d 306 (Okla. 1953); In re Blaydes' Estate, 202 Okla. 558, 216 P.2d 277 (1950); see Suits, Can Husband and Wife
Make a Valid Contract for Disposition of Their Joint Properties Upon
Death of the Survivor?, 30 OKLA. S.BJ. 2162, 2163 (1959).
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will having a binding effect prior to the testator's death,4 7 or
trusts under which the testator serves as trustee 4a -because the
testator retains complete control over his property during his lifetime.
II.

STATUTES ON CONSENT

and Minnesota50 have adopted statutes that deal
with the effect of a spouse's consent to the terms of a will. 5 Both
Kansas49

47. If the contract is for specific real property, the testator would, of
course, breach the contract by selling the property even though the rights
in the property itself under the contract would not be defeated unless the
sale is to a bona fide purchaser. See, e.g., Erwin v. Erwin, 17 N.Y. Supp.
442 (Sup. Ct. 1892), afl'd, 139 N.Y. 616, 35 N.E. 204 (1893); McCullom
v. Mackrell, 13 S.D. 262, 83 N.W. 255 (1900); SPARKS, op. cit. supra note
14, at 53. If the contract is for a fractional share of the estate, the testator may have the right to sell or to make gifts of his property, but he is
subject to a number of restrictions. Sparks, Contract To Devise or Bequeath
as an Estate Planning Device, 20 Mo. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1955). Aside from
the limitations that are imposed upon the testator's use of his property,
a contract to make a will that has a binding effect prior to the testator's
death is an unwise estate planning device unless the testator "is ready to
make a final and irrevocable commitment for the disposition of his property." Id. at 12.
48. Although the testator retains physical control over his assets by creating a trust for which he is the trustee, he is subject to liability for possible
breach of trust. See 2 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 201 (2d ed. 1956).
49. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-602 (1949):
Neither spouse shall will away from the other more than half of his
property . . . unless the other shall consent thereto in writing executed in the presence of two or more competent witnesses ....
50. MINN. STAT. § 525.16 (1961):
[T]he estate, real and personal, shall descend and be distributed as
follows:
(I) Personal property: To the surviving spouse one-third thereof
free from any testamentary disposition thereof to which such survivor
shall not have consented in writing . . .;
(2) Real property: To the surviving spouse an undivided one-third
of all real property . . . to the disposition whereof by will or otherwise such survivor shall not have consented in writing ....
51. New York has a consent statute that differs substantially from the
Kansas and Minnesota statutes. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 18(9); see Atkinson & Stark, Succession, 1954 Survey of N.Y. Law. 29 N.Y.j.I..
REV. 1652, 1653-54 (1954); Huston, Succession, 1958 Survey of NY.
Law. 33 N.Y U.L. REV. 1218, 1220-21 (1958); Huston, Succession,
1957 Survey of N.Y. Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1452, 1453 (1957); Lieb
& Wachtell, Succession, 1953 Survey of N.Y. Law, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1494, 1498-99 (1953).
Some -lat-s bar dower by jointure executed prior to marriage. E.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-110(1) (Supp. 1961); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2103.03 (Page 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. § 113.430 (1961); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 33-4-32 (1956). Other states expressly permit husband and
wif- I- -nt-r i't- a contract either h-fore c'r after marriage that would
b-r dower. E.q.. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-12 (Supp. 1961): ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3, § 24 (1961). The Connecticut and Illinois statut-s require consideration to bar dower since both refer to "a contract." See Sacksell v.
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statutes have been construed to allow a waiver of the spouse's statu-

tory rights without consideration.52 Hence, in contrast to those
states where a consent agreement must be sustained on con-

tract principles, the fact that the consenting spouse receives less
under the will than by an election against the will cannot consti-

tute a basis for disregarding the consent agreement and electing
against the will.
Both the Kansas and Minnesota consent statutes are silent as to
the revocability of consent.' In Kansas, however, a written con-

sent to a will executed during the testator's lifetime has been construed as having the same effect as an election after the testators
death.' Therefore, the Kansas Supreme Court in Chilson v.
Rodgers55 held that the consent is irrevocable once it is delivered

to the testator.56 The court reasoned that if the legislature had
Estate of Sacksell, 12 Conn. Supp. 139 (Super. Ct. 1943); Seuss v. Schukat,
358 IMI. 27, 192 N.E. 668 (1934).
52. Erickson v. Robertson, 116 Minn. 90, 133 N.V. 164 (1911); see In
re Estate of Patzner, 173 Kan. 133, 244 P.2d 1183 (1952). In Hanson v.
Hanson, 81 Kan. 305, 105 Pac. 444 (1909), a consent agreement was held
valid although the consenting spouse took nothing under the will. The New
York statute explicitly provides that the consent agreement may be effective
without consideration. N.Y. DECED. EST. LAW § 18(9).
53. A consent clearly does not make the will irrevocable in either Kansas
or Minnesota. The testators ability to change his will without destroying the
consent is unclear, however. A recent New York case held that a consent was
ineffective against a will that was changed but remained substantially the
same as one to which the consent had been obtained. In the Matter of the
Estate of Deffner, 281 App. Div. 798, 119 N.Y.S.2d 443, affd, 305 N.Y.
783, 113 N.E.2d 300 (1953). The surrogate court had held that the consent
was effective except as to a legacy that had not been in the first will. In
the Matter of the Estate of Deffner, 202 Misc. 1, 114 N.Y.S.2d 600 (Surr.
Ct. 1952). The decision was reversed by applying the familiar rule that a
waiver is to be given a narrow construction. The appellate decision has been
criticized on the ground that the rule of construction employed by the court
had no valid application to the case: "The waiver, logically speaking, refers
not to a piece of paper, the particular formal will, but rather to an idea;
that is, the diversion of the decedent's property from the spouse to a specified alternate beneficiary." Lieb & Wachtell, supra note 51, at 1499.
54. Harris, Administration of Estates, 8 KAN. L. REV. 185, 188 (1959);
see Brooks v. Olson, 170 Kan. 138, 223 P.2d 721 (1950); Aten v. Tobias,
114 Kan. 646, 220 Pac. 196 (1923); Keeler v. Lauer, 73 Kan. 388, 85
Pac. 541 (1906).
55. 91 Kar. 426, 137 Pac. 936 (1914).
56. The court found that the consenting spouse had been adequately
informed as to the extent of the testators property and her statutory rights.
The absence of such disclosure can constitute a basis for electing against
the will. In State ex rel. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co. v. Probate Court, 129
Minn. 442, 446-47, 152 N.W. 845, 846 (1915), the court stated:
There is cast upon the husband, in taking a consent to the making of his
will, . . . the affirmative duty of making to his wife a fair disclosure
of his property and her rights, so that her consent will be an actual
one, based upon an intelligent knowledge of his property and the effect of her consent, as distinguished from one merely formal.
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intended a consent to be revocable during the testator's lifetime,
it would have so provided through a specific statute, as it had for
the execution of the consent and for the revocation of a will.
As a further basis for holding that a consent is irrevocable, the
Chilson court argued that fraudulent claims of a revocation would
be difficult to meet after the testator's death. Making the consent
irrevocable for this reason is unnecessary since the courts have
generally recognized a presumption that the consent to the terms
of a will is effective. For example, where the consenting spouse
has contended that the consent agreement was ineffective, the
representative of the testator's estate is not required to show that
the consent had been properly obtained. 7 Furthermore, the invalidity of a consent clause must "clearly appear" from the evidence, and the testimony of the consenting spouse is not sufficient
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.58 A consenting
spouse seeking to elect against a will on the ground that the consent had been revoked is arguing that the consent is ineffective;
she should therefore be required to overcome the presumption of
validity of the agreement by clear evidence of revocation. Because
of the quantum of evidence required to overcome this presumption
of validity of the consent clause, the Chilson court's fear of fraudulent claims of revocation would seem unwarranted.
In Minnesota, the right of the consenting spouse to revoke her
consent during the testator's life is unclear. In Radl v. Radl,59
These requirements have been set out in a number of cases both in Kansas and in Minnesota. E.g., In re Estate of Patzner, 173 Kan. 133, 244
P.2d 1183 (1952); Woodworth v. Gideon, 136 Kan. 116, 12 P.2d 722 (1932);
Radl v. Radl, 72 Minn. 81, 75 N.W. 111 (1898). But see In the Matter of the
Estate of Ellis, 168 Kan. 11, 29, 210 P.2d 417, 429 (1949).
The failure to meet these requirements is often alleged after the testator's
death to enable the consenting spouse to elect against his will. See, e.g.,
Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924); State ex rel. Mueller
v. Probate Court, 226 Minn. 346, 32 N.W.2d 863 (1948). The testator should
prepare for this contingency by providing his spouse with independent counsel at the time the consent is executed. See Williams v. Sechler, 127 Kan.
314, 273 Pac. 447 (1929). A more common precaution is to have the instrument contain a provision that the consenting spouse is fully informed as to
the testator's property, the terms of his will, and her statutory rights. See,
e.g., In the Matter of the Estate of Whitney, 171 Cal. 750, 154 Pac. 855
(1916). The value of such a recital is unclear. In at least two eases, the recital seems to have been given no weight. See Williams v. Sechler, 127
Kan. 314, 273 Pac. 447 (1929); Weisner v. Weisner, 89 Kan. 352, 131
Pac. 608 (1913). Because the recital would seem to be a mere formality, it
should not, standing alone, be persuasive that a proper disclosure had been
made.
57. Menke v. Duwe, 117 Kan. 207, 230 Pac. 1065 (1924).
58. In re Estate of Patzner, 173 Kan. 133, 141, 244 P.2d 1183, 1190
(1952).
59. 72 Minn. 81, 75 N.W. 111 (1898).
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the only Minnesota case that has dealt with this problem, the court
declared that "if the choice is once made, the assent given and
statutory rights relinquished, the act cannot be rescinded, no matter what may thereafter occur to make it desirable."' Since a will
is revocable, the consenting spouse's statutory rights are not relinquished until the testator's death. But the court's reference to
events making revocation of the consent desirable would seem to
refer to a time prior to the testator's death, for the value of an estate would not normally increase substantially during the time after
the testator's death in which an election is permitted."' The entire
statement would seem, in any event, to be based on the statutory
effect of the consent because no contract theory would support it.
Aside from the objection of lack of mutuality of obligation,' 2 contracts between husband and wife that purport to release interests
in real property are void in Minnesota.' Thus, the consent's irrevocability must be determined by a construction of the consent
statute. The inference of legislative intent that was made by the
Kansas court in the Chilson case-that a consent is irrevocable
once it is delivered to the testator-would therefore seem to be
just as applicable in Minnesota; both states have statutes for the
consent's execution and none for its revocation. This holding would
also seem to be in accordance with the purpose of the consent statutes of providing greater freedom of testamentary disposition. If
the consent were revocable, it would bar an election only if it
were in effect at the time of the testator's death."r
The Chilson decision is, however, in conflict with the standard
of fairness demanded of transactions between husband and wife.6
60. Id. at 85, 75 N.W. at 112.

61. MINN. STAT. § 525.212 (1961) provides that a surviving spouse shall
take under the will unless it is renounced within six months after the filing
of the probate certificate.
62. See Kreiser's Appeal, 69 Pa. 194 (1871).
63. Simmer v. Simmer, 195 Minn. 1, 261 N.W. 481 (1935); Betcher v.

Rinehart, 106 Minn. 380, 118 N.W. 1026 (1908); In re Rausch, 35 Minn.
291, 28 N.W. 920 (1886); MINN. STAT. § 519.06 (1961). Kansas has no such
rule. See Porter v. Axline, 154 Kan. 87, 114 P.2d 849 (1941).

64. The purpose of a consent statute is not primarily to benefit the consenting spouse since it prevents her election against the will. Rather, the statutes would appear to be a recognition of the frustrating effect that an
election against the will has on the testator's testamentary plan. Further, the

statutes seem to recognize the arbitrariness of a statutory share, and also
that the consenting spouse will generally be adequately protected by the
doctrine of confidential relations and by self-interest.
Other states have also enacted legislation designed to give the testator
greater freedom of testamentary disposition. See, e.g., S.D. CODE § 56.0202
(1939). See generally 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 190 (1935).
65. See, e.g., -afner v. Hafner, 237 Minn. 424, 54 N.W.2d 854 (1952),
37 MINN. L. REV. 489 (1953); Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477, 25 N.W.2d

225 (1946); In re Estate of Malchow, 143 Minn. 53, 172 N.W. 915 (1919).
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A substantial increase in the testator's property after the consent
has been given may render the consenting spouse's provision, which
was "fair" in relation to the testator's property and the consenting
spouse's statutory rights at the time of the consent's execution,
highly inequitable. 66 The argument that this is merely a risk the
consenting spouse assumes is inappropriate because the testator
takes no corresponding risk; if the consent agreement becomes disadvantageous to the testator, it could not prejudice him because
he can revoke his will. Moreover, since the consent's validity is not
contingent upon consideration, the consenting spouse does not
have the protection that is afforded under contract principles. 7
Thus, in view of the inequities that could result from an irrevocable consent, perhaps a stronger inference of legislative intent that
it be irrevocable is necessary than was found in Chilson.
CONCLUSION
A spouse's consent to the terms of a will can be an important
estate planning tool. It allows the testator to retain control over
his property during his lifetime, while avoiding the frustration of
his plan of testamentary disposition that an election against his
will may produce. In those states that can sustain a consent solely
on contract principles, however, its usefulness is limited, for the
necessity for consideration and fairness may often make it ineffectual. The only certain method for preventing a failure of consideration or fairness would be self-defeating-giving the surviving spouse greater benefits under the will than she would have by
an election against it actually serves to limit the testator's freedom
of testamentary disposition.

66. To illustrate the problem, assume that a testator's only property at
the time of the will's execution was a $1,000 bank account. His spouse
consented to the will, in which she was a beneficiary of a $300 bequest
and their children were beneficiaries of a $700 bequest. Thirty years later,
when the testator has real and personal property worth a total of $36,000,
she attempts to revoke her consent. In Minnesota, her statutory rights
would be worth $12,000 if her husband were to die. See statute cited note
50 supra.

67. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.

